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Chapter 10  
Game Change in EU social policy: towards more European Integration1 
Caroline de la Porte and Elke Heins 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Welfare states have been under pressure during recent decades, in the wake of challenges 
such as ageing populations and changing family patterns. To support member states in their 
welfare and labour market reforms in the context of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
the European Union (EU) developed soft policy advice and comparative knowledge through 
various open methods of coordination (OMC). While there is dispute about the OMCs’ 
impact (de la Porte and Pochet 2012), it is an ideational tool that is not intrusive, since 
member states (MS) can voluntarily use ideas or knowledge emanating from the EU. In the 
context of the ongoing global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis which followed in 
Europe, EU actors have sought to increase coherence between economic and fiscal policies in 
an attempt to restore financial stability in the Eurozone. This involves altered and new 
instruments for social and labour market policy governance being determined almost entirely 
by economically oriented actors. Alsothe socially oriented actors are now considering new 
ideas around social and labour market policy coordination, but through less powerful 
instruments. Thus far, no systematic comparison has been made of these instruments, which is 
necessary in view of their potential impact on welfare states.  
 
                                                 
1  Special thanks to the editors Eleni Xiarchogiannopoulou and Maria Rodrigues for very helpful comments. 
Thanks also to participants of the workshop ‘The Transformation of EU Governance and Its International 
Implications’ held in Brussels in April 2013 and to the participants of the seminar ‘The Sovereign Debt Crisis, the 
EU and Welfare State Reform’ held in Odense in May 2013 for constructive comments on an earlier draft. We 
would like to thank Jochen Clasen for detailed suggestions. 
 This chapter provides a comparison of selected EU instruments for economic and social 
policy coordination before and after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. It analyses the 
direct and indirect effects that selected instruments may have on national welfare reforms by 
developing a typology to capture their type and degree of ‘integration’ effect. The analysis of 
integration of various EU instruments on national social and labour market policy is 
important, since these are areas where MS are still formally sovereign, or at least semi-
sovereign (Ferrera 2005) and intrusion (through increased integration effects) into these areas 
would raise questions of democratic legitimacy (Scharpf  2011; Streeck 2011). We argue in 
this chapter that the altered and new instruments potentially have a more integrative effect 
(and potentially also more intrusive in extreme cases) on national welfare states and labour 
markets than the pre-crisis instruments. 
 
2. Conceptualisation of Integration 
We develop a typology of ‘integration’ along three dimensions (interference, surveillance, 
coercion) to capture how a particular instrument may affect national policy, directly or 
indirectly. In our typology (Table 10.1), four degrees of integration (from low to very high) 
are suggested for each dimension. In the empirical analysis that follows, we consider the 
balance of actors involved in each instrument along our three dimensions, that is, in devising 
policy aims (which could involve more or less interference in MS policies), in the 
surveillance process and/or in ensuring coercion. Based on our insights into the different 
processes, we argue that including employment and social policy actors (or other issue-
specific actors) within a policy process provides a more comprehensive approach, compared 
to processes driven exclusively or mainly by actors in economic and financial affairs. 
 
Table 10.1 Typology of ‘integration’  
Dimension of 
integration 
Degree of integration 
Low Medium High Very high 
 Interference 
NB. This may 
differ 
according to 
the type of 
welfare state 
(and policy 
area) 
Uncontroversial 
objectives, not 
challenging existent 
MS policies or 
institutional 
arrangements, merely 
suggesting some 
minor adjustments in 
a particular policy 
area. 
 
Objectives 
challenging some 
existing policies, 
but not the 
underlying 
institutional 
structure of a 
policy area. 
 
Objectives requiring 
comprehensive policy 
reform with the 
potential for 
undermining the 
existing institutional 
structure and 
fundamental principles 
of a policy area. 
Objectives requiring 
far-reaching structural 
policy reform with a 
high potential for 
undermining the 
existing institutional 
structure and for 
changing the 
fundamental principles 
of a policy area. 
Surveillance Infrequent ex-post 
EU surveillance of 
national policy 
reports.  
Frequent ex-post 
surveillance of 
national reports 
that specify policy 
which should meet 
common 
benchmarks 
and/or own 
national targets. 
Regular ex-ante and 
ex-post EU 
surveillance of 
national policy 
reports. MS are held 
accountable to EU 
benchmarks and are 
required to specify 
national targets and 
action plan to meet 
these. 
Frequent ex-ante and 
ex-post EU 
surveillance of 
national policy 
reports. MS are held 
accountable to their 
own policies (which 
must aim to meet 
European targets 
and/or policy). 
Coercion  ‘Naming and 
shaming’ and/or soft 
recommendations 
(with a weak treaty 
base). 
Strong treaty-
based 
recommendations, 
but no sanctions. 
Treaty-based 
recommendations and 
ultimately financial 
sanctions in the case 
of non-compliance. 
Treaty-based 
corrective action 
and/or conditionality 
in order to receive 
financial assistance. 
Source: Own conceptualisation 
   
The first dimension of integration is interference in national policy, that is, the extent 
to which the EU interferes in MS sovereignty in labour market and social policy – where EU 
competencies are marginal – by requiring policy changes in these areas. This may lead to 
controversy about, or resistance against, the EU policy intervention at national level among 
populations and/or among political elites. In other words, interference assesses the extent to 
which an EU measure meddles with existing welfare state arrangements. There are some 
areas which all MS would regard as interference, such as EU intervention in taxation or wage 
policy. Other issues, e.g. childcare policies, may be considered to be interfering in some MS, 
such as the familialistic southern European welfare states. 
The second dimension of integration is the surveillance of national policy by EU 
actors (Rodrigues 2002), which addresses the extent to which the EU is endowed with power 
to control whether MS are implementing the agreed policies and respecting or moving 
towards EU benchmarks and/or national targets. The strength of surveillance is, on the one 
hand, indicated by the frequency of surveillance as a marker of the genuine level of policy 
monitoring. On the other hand, it is also important which EU actors are involved in a 
particular surveillance process. Some EU actors, namely economic and financial actors, 
operate in areas where the EU has strong jurisdiction, in particular policy coordination around 
the Maastricht criteria (3% budget deficit and 60% public debt), so that surveillance is based 
on hard law. These actors have more power than others, such as employment and social 
affairs actors, where the EU has only weak legislative competence. Contingent factors like 
exogenous shocks or political party majorities in the Council may also influence the 
involvement of various EU actors. Social policy, social cohesion and quality in work were 
high on the agenda when there were a majority of left-leaning governments in the EU (see de 
la Porte, 2011). 
The third dimension of integration is coercion, referring to the type of measures EU 
actors have at their disposal to ensure corrective action in the case of non-compliance or 
deviation from EU policy. The strongest form of coercion is financial conditionality, such as 
 in a Memorandum of Understanding. Other forms include political sanctions, which could in 
the most extreme cases refer to exclusion from particular aspects of EU integration, such as 
EMU. This option, however, is not seen as viable among the European elites, due to the fear 
that it would lead to a domino effect and ultimately the dismantling of EMU (Scharpf 2011). 
Softer forms of political sanctioning may involve brandishing of a MS as a bad performer in a 
benchmarking process. Depending on political culture, some countries may be more sensitive 
to such ‘naming and shaming’ than others (Barbier 2008). Other types of coercion include 
country-specific policy recommendations or softer policy advice in overall performance 
assessments. In assessing coercion, it is important to take account of the institutional power 
balance between European institutions and MS. For example, if a Qualified Majority Vote 
(QMV) in the Council is necessary to impose a sanction, this means that MS have more 
leverage than European actors.By contrast, a Reverse Qualified Majority Vote (RQMV) gives 
more power to the European Commission, because a qualified majority of MS would need to 
agree not to implement a sanction. 
This typology is used to analyse EU governance instruments affecting social and 
labour market policy before and after the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. We distinguish 
between two types of instruments affecting social and labour market policy. These are firstly, 
instruments aimed at the sustainability of public finances, but which put indirect pressure on 
welfare state policies, and secondly, instruments that aim at re-calibrating social and labour 
market policy. Recalibration refers, firstly, to developing new policies in line with new 
circumstances, such as childcare institutions to ensure cognitive development of children and 
to facilitate female labour market participation, central in the social investment paradigm. 
Social investment refers to investment in the capabilities of individuals throughout the life-
course to have high rates of labour market participation, and in order to ensure that welfare 
states are socially and economically sustainable (Morel et al. 2012). Secondly, it refers to 
adapting existing arrangements in order for particular programmes to meet their original aims, 
such as sickness insurance (Pierson 2001). 
3. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for Fiscal Consolidation  
 The SGP Before the Crisis  
  
European Integration took on an entirely new turn with the Maastricht Treaty (1991), which 
institutionalised EMU. Monetary policy was pooled at EU level, with the independent ECB as 
the key player, setting the interest rate based on the average performance of EMU economies. 
EMU also deprived MS of the ability to adjust exchange rates in response to economic 
problems. The belief was that a common monetarist policy would have an integrative effect 
with positive spill-over effects from monetary to economic policy and eventually to other 
areas, such as social policy (Scharpf 2002; 2011; Degryse 2012). 
The micro-foundations of monetarism lie in neo-classical economic theory and are 
associated with various supply-side policy solutions, such as tax cuts, privatisation, 
liberalisation and de-regulation. Formally, the ECB does not have the power to propose such 
policies (Scharpf 2011). Nevertheless, social policy came under pressure via the fiscal 
consolidation aims, necessary for the establishment and functioning of the the EMU. As a 
consequence, public expenditure – of which pensions and health care are important 
components – became the object of close European scrutiny. 
EMU governance pre-crisis consisted of strict legally binding fiscal monitoring of 
MS by the European Commission and the Council of Ministers through policy coordination in 
the SGP that stipulated a maximum limit for budget deficits of 3 per cent GDP, and public 
debt of maximum 60 per cent GDP (or falling). The ‘preventative arm’ of the SGP prescribes 
the measures for sound fiscal policies. Before the crisis, MS had to annually submit their 
medium-term budgetary plans in stability programmes (Eurozone members) or convergence 
programmes (members outside of the Eurozone), to illustrate their efforts with regard to the 
objectives of the SGP. 
A second ‘corrective arm’ of the SGP prescribed ‘hard’ remedial action through an 
‘Excessive Deficit Procedure’ (EDP) in case the 3 per cent budget deficit criterion was 
violated. The public debt level – at maximum 60 per cent GDP or falling – was ‘unavoidably 
imprecise’ and thereby non-sanctionable (Hodson and Maher 2004: 801). If corrective action 
 under the EDP remained absent after multiple warnings, the Commission and the Council 
could issue a pecuniary fine for Eurozone members and, for all countries, the possible 
suspension of support from the Cohesion Fund until the excessive deficit was corrected 
(Degryse 2012). 
The interference of the SGP with MS policies was high – sound fiscal policies were a 
pre-condition for EMU membership, which required strict discipline with regard to the set 
ceiling for government deficit that had to be respected permanently among Eurozone 
members. For some countries, such as Germany, this initially posed only little pressure, since 
the EMU was developed on the basis of the German model, consisting of a centralised 
monetary policy and with it, a central bank. In other countries eager to join the EMU from the 
outset, such as Spain, Portugal or Italy, a series of reforms was undertaken to meet the entry 
criteria of the SGP. In particular, tri-partite social pacts were agreed on fiscal and labour 
market policy to enhance competitiveness (Fajertag and Pochet 2000). 
EU surveillance via the SGP was medium – fiscal surveillance took place annually and was 
overseen by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) and the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin), with a treaty base for their activity. 
Coercion was formally high, as non-compliance with the budget deficit criterion could lead to 
an EDP that required corrective action and in the event of continued non-compliance, the 
Council could impose financial sanctions. However, in order to issue country-specific 
recommendations or an EDP, a qualified majority of MS needed to be in favour of this. In 
practice, the SGP has proven to be non-enforceable against big MS such as Germany and 
France, which were drivers of its creation, yet both ran excessive deficits after the SGP came 
into force and were under the EDP for some years (Howarth 2007). In fact, of the then 27 EU 
members, 13 have been under the EDP before the onset of the crisis in 2008 (Table 10.2).  
 
Table 10.2 Excessive Deficit Procedures starting before 2008 
MS EDP period 
 Czech Republic 2004–2008 
Cyprus 2004–2006 
France 2003–2007  
Germany 2002–2007 
Greece 2004–2007 
Hungary 2004–2013 
Italy 2005–2008 
Malta 2004–2007 
Netherlands 2004–2005 
Poland 2004–2008 
Portugal 2002– 2004; 2005–2008 
Slovakia 2004–2008 
United Kingdom 2004 and 2005–2007 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/index_en.htm (last accessed 30 
May 2013) 
The members aiming to be members of EMU show efforts to meet convergence criteria in 
their convergence programmes, while full EMU members show how they continue to meet 
the criteria or in the case of an EDP, how they plan to correct the breach of the deficit 
criterion to meet the deadline set by the Commission for this. Most countries then adopted 
policies to reconsolidate public finances, which the European Commission closely monitored, 
in collaboration with Finance Ministries (see de la Porte and Natali, 2014 for a recent case 
study). In some cases, more time was given to consolidate public finances, so the period for 
surveillance was extended. In yet other cases, policies required to comply with the 
convergence criteria were not adopted and the fiscal situation did not improve. But even when 
that was the case, financial sanctions were not levied. The Ecofin Council was reluctant to 
trigger sanctions against MS, but at the time, markets did not react adversely to the inaction of 
Ecofin. 
 There were limitations to SGP since the bigger Member States had some political 
room for manouevure: when Germany and France, did not fulfill their obligations under their 
respective EDPs, the Commisison’s recommendations to step up the EDPs were vetoed in the 
Council. Following pressure from Germany and France, in 2005 the SGP was altered, to take 
due account of public investments that would bear success in the future. The SGP had thus 
been criticised for its weak enforcement of the deficit rule, as well as the neglect of the debt 
criterion (de Haan et al. 2004). Hodson and Maher (2004: 809) argued that the SGP has from 
the outset been a highly discretionary instrument in the realm of soft law. On the basis of the 
capability of some member states to negotiate whether and if so when and how to meet the 
excessive deficit criterion, we assess that coercion was de facto only medium. 
 
 The SGP since the Crisis 
 
Since the 2008 global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis which followed in Europe, 
EU actors (especially the ECB, DG ECFIN and the Ecofin Council) have sought to increase 
coherence between economic, financial and fiscal policies, in an attempt to restore financial 
stability in the Eurozone. In addition, efforts have been made to enhance both ex-ante and ex-
post surveillance of policies and to increase coercion, especially increasing possibilities for 
sanctions in case of deviation from agreed policies or benchmarks. The revised SGP and new 
instruments are coordinated jointly in the ‘European Semester’, which includes first and 
foremost policies of fiscal consolidation and, at the very end of the list, policies for social 
sustainability of European welfare states. In the following, we present the core features of the 
European Semester and central instruments – the Fiscal Compact (FC) and the six-pack – 
within it. Thereafter, we present the Europe 2020 strategy – also integrated into the European 
Semester – with an emphasis on its social policy aims. 
Instruments for Sustainability of Public Finances (2008–present) 
In 2010, the European Semester was developed in order to coordinate ex ante the budgetary 
and economic policies of MS and to increase coherence among different policies. More 
 specifically, EU-level discussions take place prior to MS drawing up their annual draft 
budgets and on a broader palette of policy areas (with accompanying indicators), including 
macroeconomic imbalances, financial sector issues, and structural reforms. The European 
Semester is launched by the European Commission (DG ECFIN) via an Annual Growth 
Survey (AGS) (European Commission 2013d). The 2011 AGS, for example, focused on fiscal 
consolidation, labour market reforms, and ‘growth enhancing measures’ (European 
Commission 2010g). Following the AGS, country-specific recommendations are made to MS 
on the basis of a DG ECFIN proposal that must be approved by Ecofin through QMV and is 
then to be endorsed by the European Council. The AGS explicitly includes policy advice on 
‘social consequences of the crisis’, with a focus on how to deal with the citizens hit by the 
crisis, in particular young people. In this regard, the AGS promotes active labour market 
policies, such as job search or training, as a way back to employment, with social protection 
systems as a last resort. In addition, the AGS promotes business creation and self-
employment, although in particular the latter can be very precarious in a crisis context. The 
policy priorities decided in the AGS should be included in MS Stability or Convergence 
programmes (concerning monetary policy) devised within the SGP and in NRPs (concerning 
economic, employment and social policies) devised within Europe 2020. The European 
Semester and the AGS are therefore very powerful for the agenda-setting process.  
The six-pack and the FC aim to reinforce the policy aims of the European Semester 
and to enhance EU surveillance of MS policies and coercion in the case of non-compliance. 
Both initiatives provide the European institutions with more surveillance power vis-à-vis the 
national budgets of MS compared to pre-crisis and are designed to reinforce the 
implementation of the SGP and the European Semester within which they are embedded. 
The six-pack came into force in December 2011 (consisting of five Regulations and 
one Directive)2 and applies to all 27 MS, but with some specific rules for Eurozone members, 
                                                 
2  The six parts are the: (1) strengthening surveillance of budgetary positions and coordination of economic 
policies, (2) acceleration and clarification of the EDP through a Council regulation, (3) enforcement of budgetary 
 especially regarding financial sanctions. The six-pack covers not only fiscal, but also 
macroeconomic surveillance under the new ‘Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure’ (MIP), 
which aims to be more broad-ranging than the former SGP which focused only on public 
finances. Under the six-pack, member states’ budget balance should converge towards 
country-specific Medium-Term Objectives (MTOs) (relating to the SGP’s preventative arm). 
Stricter application of fiscal rules shouldbe ensured by defining quantitatively what a 
‘significant deviation’ from the MTO, or the adjustment path towards it, means. The six-pack 
also reinforces the corrective arm of the SGP, that is, the EDP, which applies to MS that have 
breached either the deficit or the debt criterion (the latter not being operational before the six-
pack). Another important novelty is that the six-pack introduces RQMV for deciding on 
sanctions. This means that a qualified majority of MS (in Ecofin) must be against a 
Commission (DG ECFIN) proposal for an EDP, or for a sanction to be overturned. This 
constitutes a very clear increase in power for the European Commission, especially DG 
ECFIN.  
The FC, signed in March 2012 by all EU members except the Czech Republic and the 
United Kingdom, applies to all Eurozone members and, upon their discretion, also to non-
Eurozone countries. It further strengthens the balanced budget rules of the SGP, with an 
additional limit of 0.5 per cent of GDP on structural deficits (that can be extended to 1 per 
cent in exceptional circumstances). The FC requires these budget rules to be integrated in 
national law, preferably at constitutional level. Corrective mechanisms at national level will 
be triggered automatically in case of deviation from the MTO or the adjustment path towards 
it. Likewise, the automatism of the EDP has been strengthened. Should a country fail to 
transpose the budget rules and the correction mechanism on time, the European Court of 
Justice has the jurisdiction to take a decision on the matter, including the imposition of a 
financial sanction (up to 0.1 per cent of GDP) (European Central Bank 2012: 83). 
                                                                                                                                           
surveillance in the Eurozone through a regulation, (4) definition of a budgetary framework of the MS through a 
Directive, (5) prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances through a regulation, (6) enforcement of 
measures for correcting excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone. 
 Contrasting with the pre-crisis period, the European Semester now takes account of 
the whole economy via the MIP, and not just budget deficits and public debt. This is because 
it became clear to European actors that taking account of budgetary discipline alone would 
not suffice for economic growth or crisis prevention. The MIP thus focuses on total (public 
and private) debt, current account balances, unit labour costs, real effective exchange rates 
and other indicators that cover overall national economic performance. While this is designed 
to ensure early intervention in economies which are overheating, most of the indicators of the 
MIP are not under direct control of governments (Scharpf 2011: 33). Since the MIP is the 
central instrument on which European actors formulate national recommendations and, more 
crucially, launch an EDP in the case of non-compliance, interference in MS policies is high, 
as controversial structural adjustments are suggested following the MIP, including the 
privatisation of public services, labour market flexibilisation, tax reforms, liberalisation of 
product and service markets as well as social spending cuts (DG ECFIN 2012). 
Surveillance is also reinforced – it is very frequent when a country is under EDP – 
and coercion is high – an interest-bearing deposit of 0.2 per cent of GDP may be imposed if 
insufficient progress is made towards the MTOs of Eurozone MS (European Parliament and 
European Council 2011). Thus sanctions can be implemented quite early on if certain targets 
are missed. 
 
Table 10.3 Excessive Deficit Procedures started after 2008 
MS EDP period 
Austria 2009–ongoing 
Belgium 2009–ongoing (EDP 
recommended to be stepped 
up in 05/2013) 
Bulgaria 2010–2012 
Czech Republic 2009–recommended to be 
 abrogated in 05/2013 
Cyprus 2010-ongoing (under MoU) 
Denmark 2010-ongoing 
Finland 2010-2011 
France 2009–ongoing 
Germany 2009-2012 
Greece 2009–ongoing (under MoU)  
Ireland  2009-ongoing (under MoU) 
Italy 2009-2013 
Latvia 2009-2013 
Lithuania 2009-2013 
Luxembourg 2010 
Malta 2009-2012; new EDP 
recommended in 05/2013 
Netherlands  2009-ongoing 
Poland 2009-ongoing 
Portugal 2009-ongoing (under MoU) 
Romania  2009-2013 
Slovakia 2009-ongoing 
Slovenia 2009-ongoing 
Spain 2009-ongoing  
United Kingdom 2008-ongoing 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/index_en.htm 
 
Table 10.3 shows a notable increase in the number of countries under an EDP since 
the financial and economic crisis set in (from 13 to 24). At the time of writing, it remains to 
be seen to what extent this is followed by stricter action than in the pre-crisis period. It has to 
 be noted, however, that the if economic circumstances are adverse, recommendation to reduce 
the deficit are prolonged or even stopped temporarily, as long as effective action 
(recommended policies) has been taken. On this basis, in May 2013 six countries were 
granted an extension to rectify their deficits (European Commission 2013e: 6–7). 
There is no doubt that for countries which are under special EU-IMF financial rescue 
packages (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus) EU integration, through conditional 
financial support (EU-IMF loans) in exchange for structural reform, has increased to very 
high levels. Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) specify in detail the policy measures that 
have to be implemented, often highly interfering with existing institutional designs. 
Monitoring  takes place very frequently under MoUs.  
4. Instruments for Re-calibrating Social and Labour Market Policy  
 Before the Crisis: The European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Lisbon Strategy 
The policy coordination stipulated by the SGP gave rise to concerns about the limitations to 
MS autonomy in core redistributive areas. A political consensus among left parties in the 
Council in the mid-1990s led to an agreement on supplementing monetary and economic 
policy coordination with a similar, albeit softer, coordination procedure for social and labour 
market policies: the European Employment Strategy (EES), the first ‘Open Method of 
Coordination’ (OMC) (de la Porte 2011). The OMC became an important instrument to 
support MS in welfare state reform, in the view of common challenges, such as population 
ageing (Jæger and Kvist 2003) and built on ideas of ‘social investment’ (Morel et al. 2012). 
The aim of the EES – integrated in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 – was to develop a 
highly skilled labour force and to achieve high levels of employment. The ambition was to 
create ‘more and better jobs’, hence not only boosting employment growth, but also 
maximising its quality with a view to shaping a competitive, knowledge-based economy. The 
policies initially promoted in the EES (and later in other social OMCs) resonate with the 
normative notion of a ‘European Social Model’ (Jepsen and Serrano Pascual 2005), 
associated with a high level of social protection and high rates of labour market participation. 
Activation, ‘making work pay’, and quality of work were key notions. The promotion of 
 equal opportunities between men and women was also central, including the aim to develop 
childcare institutions. The EES was, however, subordinate to the monetarist policy framework 
established via the EMU. Since the EES – requiring considerable financial investments – was 
to be implemented in the context of the EMU – requiring fiscal consolidation – the inherent 
risk was that comprehensive social investment would not materialise (de la Porte and 
Jacobsson 2012). 
The EES was nevertheless considered an appropriate way to address common 
challenges, while being adaptable to different welfare state types. On this basis, the Lisbon 
European Council in 2000 institutionalised the OMC as a voluntary non-treaty based 
mechanism for MS to confront common challenges in sensitive areas. The codified ‘Lisbon 
Strategy’ aimed to put economic policy and competitiveness on an equal footing with 
employment and social policy (European Council 2000). This included the EU benchmark of 
reaching an average employment rate of 70 per cent for the EU by 2010 (and 60 per cent for 
women as well as 50 per cent for older workers) (European Council 2000, 2001). There were 
high hopes that the Lisbon Strategy – strengthened with quantitative benchmarks – would be 
an effective vehicle for achieving activation, training, and high levels of (quality) 
employment. 
The EES represented a medium degree of interference into national policies because 
of its promotion of high employment rates as well as family-friendly and activation policies. 
Particular pressure was put on countries with low rates of female and older worker 
participation. Furthermore, it also included more sensitive issues, such as the reduction of 
non-wage labour costs, and flexicurity – the combination of flexible labour markets, 
activation and social security – which was resisted by many unions who feared that it would 
be interpreted exclusively as labour market flexibility (Viebrock and Clasen 2009). Indeed, 
empirical evidence suggests that in countries that have caught on to the flexicurity buzzword, 
there has been most focus on labour market de-regulation. After 2005, the EES became more 
narrowly focused on boosting labour supply, skills enhancement and the improvement of 
education systems. The aims relating to gender equality and reconciling work and family life 
 were put in the background. Impact analyses of the EES have revealed that activation as 
conceived in the EES has been influential discursively, but has only marginally been used as a 
resource through which to develop a comprehensive social investment policy, albeit with 
important cross-regime variation (de la Porte and Jacobsson 2012). 
The surveillance in the EES was low for several reasons. First, although the EES has 
a treaty base, it is a voluntary policy coordination process. All MS participate in the process, 
but the extent to which they actually meet EES objectives is, ultimately, voluntary. The 
iterative policy cycle consists of setting common EU objectives (further specified by common 
benchmarks and EU indicators); regular National Action Plans (NAPs), designed to show 
what MS had done to meet employment policy objectives and to present their future plans in 
light of EES objectives; and monitoring and evaluation of these strategies jointly by the 
European Commission and the MS. The process was yearly until 2005, after which NAPs 
became more closely integrated with economic policy coordination in three-yearly National 
Reform Programmes (NRPs). 
The Lisbon European Council strengthened the Employment and Social Affairs 
Council, since it aimed to put various Council formations on an equal footing with the Ecofin 
Council. This equally implied that the Directorate-General Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion (DG EMPL) was strengthened vis-à-vis DG ECFIN (Rodrigues 2002). After 2005, 
however, when the EES became more strongly integrated with economic policy coordination 
(de Roose et al. 2008), the influence of DG ECFIN and the Ecofin Council increased. At the 
same time, a ‘Mr. or Mrs. Lisbon’ – often a Prime Minister or Finance Minister – was 
designated in each MS to ensure that the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy were integrated in 
national political processes, with mixed results (Borras and Peters 2011). Although economic 
and employment policy were coordinated jointly after 2005, surveillance remained low (de 
Roose et al. 2008). 
Coercion of the EES was also low. Since 1998, the EES has involved country-
specific recommendations, to be approved via QMV in the Council. However, compliance 
with the policy objectives, highlighted in country recommendations, was encouraged, but 
 could not be enforced (de la Porte 2011). Indeed, the thought behind the social OMCs was 
that they should prompt transnational discussions and propose interesting ideas in a context 
where MS would be required to reform their welfare states due to common challenges.  There 
is  evidence that the ideas developed through the OMCs, and especially via  the country-
specific recommendations have at times been sources of inspiration for reforms (de la Porte 
and Jacobsson 2012). Yet, the EES only provided a legally non-binding framework of 
political coordination, leaving responsibility for reforms with MS. 
Instruments for Re-calibrating Social Policy since  the crisis: Europe 2020 
In 2010, a new strategy coined ‘Europe 2020’ replaced the Lisbon Strategy, within which the 
instruments for re-calibrating social policy – in particular the EES – are now embedded. In 
the EU’s revamped strategy to deliver ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive’ growth, the aim to 
increase labour market participation – to 75 per cent by 2020 – stands stronger than ever (EU 
Commission 2010b). The link with the SGP is much closer as well, since Europe 2020 is 
integrated into the European Semester. The assessment of the cause of the crisis by European 
economic elites and technocrats is that some countries have not paid sufficient attention to 
structural reforms. The main aim stipulated is therefore to undertake structural reforms ‘of 
pensions, health care, social protection and education systems (…)  in order to achieve ‘fiscal 
consolidation and long-term financial sustainability’ (European Commission 2010h: 26). 
Also, Europe 2020 is dominated by DG ECFIN and the Ecofin Council with a very 
marginal role for the European social policy actors (Pochet 2010). Europe 2020 is, aside re-
iterating core aims of fiscal consolidation as stated in the SGP, designed to deliver growth, if 
possible, socially sustainable growth. However, as noted by Barnard (2012), this strategy is 
dependent on significant government expenditure, which governments encumbered by 
sovereign debt are hardly able to provide. 
Although there have been remarkable increases in employment rates since the launch 
of the Lisbon Strategy, this was for the most part achieved through atypical contracts, 
providing little security for workers (Emmenegger et al. 2012). Unsurprisingly, atypical 
workers have been hit first by the crisis. Where employment has started to pick up again, we 
 find a remarkably high proportion of non-standard contracts (Leschke 2012). Contrary to the 
optimistic social agenda that characterised the original Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 is silent 
on the previously prominent issue of quality of work. However, on a more positive note, the 
European Commission has now launched a Social Investment Package, aimed at investing in 
individuals throughout the lifecourse, particularly focused on human capital development 
(European Commission, 2013).  
The potential integrative effect of Europe 2020 is the same as under the EES and 
much weaker as regards all three dimensions than the new fiscal policy instruments (Table 
10.4). Only where Europe 2020 overlaps with the revised SGP is EU integration enhanced, as 
the FC and the six-pack clearly strengthens the European actors (especially DG ECFIN) to 
survey MS policies and economic indicators, as well as ensure coercion, since an EDP is now 
easier to launch and sanctions are easier to impose through RQMV in the case of non-
compliance. 
 
Table 10.4 Integration effects of main EU fiscal and social instruments before and after 
the crisis 
 
 
Interference Surveillance Coercion 
SGP (pre-crisis) High Medium Medium 
EES Medium Low Low 
Six-pack and FC High High High 
Europe 2020 Medium Low Low 
 
In sum, the European Semester and the instruments designed to reinforce it are highly 
intrusive on the dimensions of policy interference, surveillance and coercion. Both the six-
pack and the FC really give the European Semester and the SGP bite, which was not the case 
before the crisis. It is also to be noted that in the context of the crisis, it is mainly the actors in 
 economic and financial affairs that set the agenda, while the labour market and social policy 
actors have less voice. However, there are attempts to develop a social investment policy 
approach among the socially oriented actors in the Commission (Kvist 2013; European 
Commission, 2013). 
5. Conclusion 
Our analysis has shown that in the perpetuation of economic difficulties in the EU, European 
leaders have strengthened the existing European instruments and developed new ones to 
enhance compliance with EU economic and financial aims, which also affect welfare states 
indirectly. In the context of the crisis, it is along the dimensions of surveillance and coercion 
that integration effects of EU instruments for economic and financial policy coordination – 
European Semester, Stability and Growth Pack, the six-pack and the fiscal compact - has 
increased. The sharpened old and new instruments have increased the power of the EU, 
especially the economically oriented actors, to insist on national fiscal discipline, a necessary 
condition for the Eurozone to function. Indeed, if the instruments are applied correctly, then 
European economies should beome more competitive and welfare states would be reformed 
around social investment. But there are risks that tough austerity and the cost containment 
that has accompanied this undermines European welfare states. 
The instruments designed to coordinate employment, social and labour market policy 
– that is Europe 2020 and especially the European employment strategy - are not sharper 
compared to before the crisis. While there are attempts to tackle youth unemployment and to 
encourage social investment policies, particularly in DG employment and the social affairs 
and employment Council, the available instruments are unlikely to have much impact on MS. 
This is particularly the case where most governments are still struggling to cope with 
recession, public debt and budget deficits and thus lacking the resources to develop 
comprehensive social investment policies.  
